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cult to ascertain before excavation, it is extremely difficult to prove,
even with the aid of the questions outlined previously, that an economic
interest has not been retained.3 Therefore, a taxpayer may find that a
transaction which is a sale under the intent of the parties test may be
deemed a lease in a circuit which follows the retained economic interest
test. In order to eliminate such a situation and to secure uniformity
throughout the circuits, it is suggested that in the area of extraction of
sand, earth fill and gravel, the intent of the parties test should be adopted.
If this test had been presently applied, the true substance of the con-
tract and the surrounding circumstances would have made clear that the
transaction was intended by both parties to be a sale. The instant deci-
sion is a good example of the confusion that results when one attempts
to apply the retained economic interest test to an area where the test is
inappropriate.
Charles Dale McClain
TAXATION-TRAVELING ExPENSES-TAxPAYER MUST MAINTAIN
PERMANENT HOME TO BE ENTITLED TO DEDUCTION.
James v. United States, (9th Cir. 1962)
Appellant worked as a traveling salesman for six manufacturers on
a commission basis, establishing his own route within the designated
territory which he covered several times each year. He deducted from
his gross income all money spent for lodging, meals, and tips while
away from Reno, Nevada as traveling expenses "while away from home"
within the meaning of § 23(a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939.1 He contended that Reno was his tax home since there he main-
tained a Post Office box and bank account, dealt with a stockbroker, had
37. Suppose the taxpayer is hesitant to make an absolute sale and the con-
tractor, who seeks to purchase the earth fill, is hesitant to make an absolute pur-
chase since the land may not produce the desired quantity or quality of earth
fill. The parties may decide to incorporate into their agreement a provision that the
contractor take only usable fill or that 'the taxpayer supply only fill that meets
certain specified standards. A strict application of the economic interest test may,
therefore, result in the transaction being taxed as a lease, although the parties may
have clearly intended a sale.
1. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a) (1) (A), 53 Stat. 12 (now INT.
Rtv. CODE oF 1954, § 162(a) (2)), provides:
"Deductions from gross income. In computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.
(1) Trade or business expenses.
(A) In general. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . . ;
traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and
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purchased his automobile and insurance, had filed his income tax return
and stored certain personal belongings. In addition, he asserted that
Reno was his headquarters for resting, taking care of his insurance, and
various other items. However, the evidence showed that his contacts
with Reno were similar to those in other cities in the sense that he
spent only thirty days of the year there while he called on business
accounts. During this period he stayed at hotels and took his meals about
town. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction on the ground that
it was not shown that the expenses were incurred while taxpayer was
"away from home." On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit sustained the district court's affirmance 2 of the Commis-
sioner's ruling, holding that a taxpayer, in order to be entitled to a
deduction for traveling expenses while away from home, must maintain
a permanent place of residence at which are incurred substantial con-
tinuing living expenses. Appellant's contacts with Reno were found
to be insufficient for this purpose. James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204
(9th Cir. 1962).
The court in the instant case rested its opinion on an analysis of
the purposes of the traveling expense deduction. Concluding that the
basis for the deduction lay in alleviating the tax discrimination between
those who are forced to travel for business reasons and those who are
not, it was noted that the former are subjected to substantially higher
expenditures by reason of duplication or inherently higher cost. Since
James lived in the same manner in Reno as he did elsewhere, the court
reasoned that he had suffered no inherently higher cost attributable to
travel. Nor had James been subjected to a duplication of living expenses
since, in his absence from Reno, he had kept no permanent quarters.
A disproportionate share of litigation has centered about the mean-
ing of the phrase "away from home" when applied to traveling expense
deductions under the Internal Revenue Code. The paucity of legislative
history surrounding the provision has prompted many questions as to
whether a particular taxpayer was away from home or whether he had
a tax home at all. The principal conflict has centered about whether the
tax home is the taxpayef's residence or his post of duty, or principal
place of business, when these are separately located. This dispute arose
through the insistence of the Commissioner and the Tax Court3 that a
person may not maintain a home where he is not engaged in a business
and at the same time deduct his business traveling expenses when away
from that home.4 The circuits are split on this question with the Ninth
2. James v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 270 (D. Nev. 1959).
3. See Robert A. Coerver, 36 T.C. 252 (1961); James M. Eaves, 33 T.C. 938
(1960). The classic case in this area, still often cited, is Mort L. Bixler, 5 B.T.A.
1181 (1927).
4. At least one commentator has implied that the special meaning used by
the Commissioner is without support in the legislative history of the act. See




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/10
SPRING 1963]
Circuit adhering to the view that home is to be interpreted literally, that
is, as the taxpayer's residence.5 However, in the present case, the court
noted that a similar decision would have been rendered under either
definition. The basic question in James concerns what contacts are
necessary to establish the physical home requisite to the deduction, re-
gardless of whether the tax home be located at the place of residence or
the place of business.
Among the most durable of the Code provisions, the pertinent
section has remained virtually unchanged in substance since 1921.6 At
that time it was amended for the benefit of the business traveler, relieving
him of the burden of proving an excess of his traveling expenses over his
normal living costs by providing that "the entire amount expended for
meals and lodging" could be deducted. Congressional debate made speci-
fic mention of the applicability of the new addition to traveling salesmen
7
but failed to produce any criteria for the determination of what is a
"home."
The United States Supreme Court has twice had the opportunity
to provide guides for interpretation but each time has bypassed the
question of "home" in favor of deciding the case on another basis. In
Commissioner v. Flowers," the Court set out the three general conditions
to be satisfied before a traveling expense could qualify as a deduction.9
In this and the later case of Peurifoy v. Commissioner,1& an interpretation
of the word "home" was not directly passed upon, although it is ques-
tionable whether a construction clear enough to control the instant case
would have resulted. In both Flowers and Peurifoy the taxpayers main-
S. Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Wallace v. Commissioner,
144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944). Accord, Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1961).
Contra, Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945). A recent study
of the problems in this area may be found in note, A House Is Not A Tax Home, 49
VA. L. Rxv. 125 (1963).
6. Compare Revenue Act of 1921, § 214(a) (1), 41 Stat. 239, with INT. Rtv.
CODE oP 1954, § 162(a) (2).
7. ". . . when the language to which I have referred was considered by the
committee it was discussed from the standpoint of allowing the exemption to
traveling salesmen. It was thought that their traveling expenses were a matter for
proper deduction and that their meals and lodging should also be included in such
deduction." 61 CONG. Rzc. 6673 (1921) (Remarks of Mr. Walsh).
8. 326 U.S. 465, 66 S. Ct. 250 (1946).
9. "Three conditions must thus be satisfied before a traveling expense deduction
may be made under § 23(a) (1) (A) :(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling expense, as that
term is generally understood. This includes such items as transportation fares and
food and lodging expenses incurred while traveling.
(2) The expense must be incurred 'while away from home.'
(3) The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business. This means that there
must be a direct connection between the expenditure and the carrying on of the
trade or business of the taxpayer or his employer. Moreover, such an expenditure
must be necessary or appropriate to the development of the business or trade." 326
U.S. 465, 470, 66 S. Ct. 250, 252 (1946).
10. 358 U.S. 59, 79 S. Ct. 104 (1958).
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tained permanent abodes for their families and neither case would have
presented the factual question at issue."
Few opinions make express mention of the standards of perma-
nence and continued expense which the present court relied on. As
early as 1929, however, the deductions of a traveling salesman were
denied on the basis that the home he claimed lacked permanence.' 2 The
taxpayer claimed residence at a hotel in Buffalo, but it was shown that
he lived and operated his business from there only when his wife, who
otherwise lived apart from him because of her poor health, was able
to be in that town. The Board said that in its opinion "Congress did not
intend to allow as deductions all the year's expenses for meals, lodging,
laundry, etc., incurred by a taxpayer who maintained no permanent
home, no definite headquarters; who traveled on a roving commission,
with headquarters wherever he happened to be."' 3  Although the
concept of permanence was alluded to in later cases as the con-
trolling factor in denying a traveling show manager 14 and a tele-
graph lineman 15 tax homes within the meaning of the Code, it is
difficult to agree within the logic of the instant case, that permanence
alone should control the deduction. Since the fundamental rationale, as
that court conceived it, is an equalization of the tax burden, it is evident
that the primary requirement to establish a tax home should be a sub-
stantial expense arising from maintenance of a residence and con-
tinuing during the absence of the taxpayer.
On the other hand, a line of cases may be found that have permitted the
deduction despite the lack of a continuing expense in the taxpayer's
absence. In Charles G. Gustafson,'6 the taxpayer was a national circula-
tion promoter for a magazine and traveled extensively, stopping occasionally
to visit his sister at her home where he stored his belongings. The Tax
Court allowed him to deduct his expenses while away from his sister's
home, although there were no actual home expenses to be duplicated and
he conducted no appreciable business from that address.' 7 In his dissent,
Judge Harron maintained that the occupation of a traveling salesman
had its necessary personal expenses attached and these should be sepa-
rated from the business expenses for tax purposes.
11. Either case, however, could have resolved the dispute as to whether the
tax home was located at the residence or the business post. Dissenting opinions in
each case favored the former approach. '
12. Charles E. Duncan, 17 B.T.A. 1088 (1929), aff'd per curiam, 47 F.2d 1082
(2d Cir. 1931).
13. Id. at 1091.
14. Moses Mitnick, 13 T.C. 1 (1949).
15. Max W. Tugal, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 693 (1961).
16. 3 T.C. 998 (1944), acq. 1944 CuM. BULL. 12.
17. Gustafson was cited as controlling in a Tax Court memorandum decision,
Philip D. Graham, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 663 (1953). The taxpayer was per-
mitted to claim his mother's residence as a tax home, despite the fact that he
returned there only on vacations and when unemployed. Although this home re-
quired no expense while he was away, it was held sufficient that he stored his
personal property there, received mail and paid personal property taxes, and used
that address for his driver's license.
[VOL. 8
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An interesting comparison may be made between the present case
and Simeon I. Smith,'8 although the latter is only a memorandum deci-
sion and therefore of limited value as authority. The petitioner was an
office manager of a book company who spent most of his time traveling.
He rented a home for his sister but stayed himself in Atlanta, Georgia
at a hotel room which he rented intermittently, relinquishing the room and
checking his bags at the hotel while away traveling. The court based a
finding that Atlanta was his home on the fact that his hotel quarters were
permanent and that his managership established a business post. This
finding is not inconsistent with the present holding if it is remembered
that in the instant decision the taxpayer was substantially an independent
contractor and his residence within Reno varied, while in Smith the tax-
payer was an employee of a company which maintained a permanent
office and he always resided in the same hotel. Nevertheless, on the
rationale of the principal case, there appears to be no valid reason why
a deduction should be allowed in the one situation and not in the other,
since a continuing expense during the taxpayer's absence is lacking in
both.
None of the above cases directly discusses or applies the continuing
expense factor. But in Chester D. Griesemer,'0 this element was made
the foundation of a holding permitting the taxpayer to deduct expenses
incurred during three years he was in France on business. The court
pointed out that the expenditures were in addition to those incurred
in maintaining his usual place of abode for his mother and sister and
thought that Congress undoubtedly intended such amounts to be de-
ductible.2 0 In a similar vein, a tacit acknowledgment of the importance of
continuing expenses may be inferred from the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fisher v. Commissioner.21 The tax-
payer, a professional itinerant musician, claimed his home to be with
his mother. He invariably returned to her residence between engage-
ments and used that address for mail and phone replies to his requests
for future commitments. In a brief opinion disallowing deduction of his
traveling expenses, the court quoted largely from the findings of fact
of the Tax Court which pointedly noted that the taxpayer had paid no
rent on his mother's apartment and had contributed to the household
expenses only when he was there. The Flowers case was cited as con-
trolling, "despite an absence of definitive characteristics for the word
'home,'...,,22
It is difficult to argue with either the rationale of the present court
or the apparent ease of application of the standards it suggests. While
both permanence and continuing expense are advocated as being necessary
18. 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1943).
19. 10 B.T.A. 386 (1928).
20. Id. at 389.
21. 230 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 218 (1954), acq. in part,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
22. Id. at 81.
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factors, it would seem that the latter should be emphasized. If, as the
court reasons, equalization of the tax burden between the business traveler
and the non-traveler is conceded to be the reason for the deduction (and
there appears to be no strong opposing argument) to permit the deduction
without the requirement that the taxpayer show he has been subject to
some substantial expense in maintaining his "home" is but to shift the
discrimination upon the non-traveler or to give the traveler a benefit to
which he is not justifiably entitled. Granting that the expense of constant
traveling is in excess of that required in living at a fixed location, it is
felt that such excess is more properly deductible as an "ordinary and
necessary" business expense. This was conceded by the instant court with
recognition of the difficulty of the resultant burden of proof on the tax-
payer in separating his personal and business expenses. Having already
noted that Congress had passed corrective legislation alleviating that
problem earlier as it was applied to traveling expenses, 23 the court sug-
gested that the enigma might be resolved either through application of
the "Cohan" doctrine 24 or through legislative relief. Since the former has
been recently abolished,25 the only solution appears to lie in further
corrective legislation. One suggestion has been to eliminate the "away
from home" requirement in cases of this type, insisting only that the
expense be attributable to traveling on business.23 Another has been to
amend the Code to permit the deduction of an arbitrary percentage of the
living expenses, 27 presumably on a basis similar to that of the standard
deduction.
Considering that expense deductions in general have been tightened in
recent legislation28 following recognition of frequent abuses in this
area,29 the standards proposed in the present case for the determination
of the home do not appear to be too harsh.30 Furthermore they provide
a workable criterion that appears to be acceptable to the Internal Revenue
Service. The Service has stated that no deduction would be allowed
23. 308 F.2d 204, 206 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 1962).
24. This doctrine provided that where it was acknowledged that expenditures
had been made which would be deductible, but the taxpaper was unable to prove the
amount, the Board must allow an estimated amount based on its own experience
and bearing heavily against the taxpayer. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540,
543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).
25. Under new amendments to the Code, considerable substantiation is required
for all traveling expense deductions. Revenue Act of 1962, § 4, adding new Code
§ 274(d).
26. ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X151(B) (5) (Feb. 1954 Draft). See also
Note, 43 VA. L. Rzv. 59, 76-77 (1957).
27. Comment, 19 U. CHi. L. Riv. 534, 546 (1952).
28. Revenue Act of 1962, § 4.
29. See generally Wakeley, Some New Thoughts on Travel and Entertainment
Expenses, N.Y.U. 20Tnn INST. ON FnD. TAX. 505 (1962).
30. Granting that the burden of proof in separating the taxpayer's personal and
business expenses may be a difficult one, travel expenses relating to meals and
lodging are basically personal in nature. Except when specifically exempted, as in
the travel expense deduction section, personal expenses have always been taxable
under the Code. See INT. Rev. CODE oF 1962, § 262. It should be remembered that
the taxpayer seeking to place himself within the exemption provision is attempting
to gain a privilege and is not being denied a right.
436 [VOL. 8
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"because of any purported connection with a particular locality where the
connection is more nominal than real and he [the taxpayer] appears
predominantly to be an itinerant worker. ,,. To be con-
sistent with the present decision, future cases similar to Smith 2
and Gustafson 3  should be resolved against permitting the deduc-
tion. There appears to be no better reason to allow the full deduction
to one whose only connection with a community is a free room in the
home of a relative than to allow it to the taxpayer in the instant case.
While such a connection is nominally permanent, it in no way results
in a continuing expenditure in the taxpayer's absence.
What further ramifications this case may have is difficult to predict.
Each case must still stand on its own facts. Now, however, the court has
a reasonable and practicable standard with which to avoid the incon-
sistencies of past decisions. To the extent that the traveler without a
home is discriminated against, it seems that he must await legislative
relief.
Michael B. Kean
31. See Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 60, 68.
32. Supra note 18.
33. Supra note 16.
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